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CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR WORK-SITE
DEATHS: OLD LAW USED A NEW WAY
I. INTRODUCTION
Work-related accidents pose a threat to the life of every person in the
United States.1 To the person working on a construction site, death may be
the result of having the employee's head knocked against a piece of equip-
ment from an airborne drilling tool,2 or the worker may be killed by a five-
pound piece of metal dropping eighty feet down a shaft.3 However, work-
related injuries resulting in death threaten non-workers as well. A passer-
by could be killed by the collapse of a multi-ton piece of machinery.4 The
first thought that comes to mind in these situations is tort liability; but cur-
rently, there is an expanding trend to hold corporations criminally liable for
such deaths.5
It is to be expected that in a modern and industrialized society some
work-related deaths will occur.6 However, there is a point at which society
does not accept this "built-in" death.rate. As corporations continue to
1. N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY 3
(1976) (recent statistics show that each year in the United States over 14,000 workers are killed in
industrial accidents; this figure does not include deaths caused by occupational diseases or expo-
sure to deadly chemicals).
2. On March 25, 1986, a construction worker, working in downtown Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
suffered massive head injuries after a weld broke loose, causing a 500-pound drilling tool to knock
his head against a crane. Milwaukee Sentinel, March 26, 1986, § 1, at 5, col. 5. Less than one
week later he died. Milwaukee Sentinel, March 31, 1986, § 1, at 5, col. 5.
3. On January 22, 1986, a Racine, Wisconsin man was seriously injured when a five-pound
piece of steel, being lowered down a shaft by a string, broke free and hit him in the head. Serious
injuries, requiring surgery, were the result even though the worker was wearing a hard hat. Mil-
waukee Journal, January 23, 1986, § 2, at 9, col. 1.
4. In May of 1985, a Manhattan woman had her legs crushed when a crane, operated by an
unqualified worker, collapsed on her legs. Seven operations have not completely rehabilitated her
legs. Milwaukee Sentinel, April 27, 1986, § 2, at 7, col. 1.
5. See Local Officials Set Up New Programs as Others Urge Caution over Trend to Use Crimi-
nal Prosecution for Workplace Hazards, 15 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1132 (April 10, 1986)
[hereinafter Workplace Hazards]; Workplace Fatality Situations Called 'Ripe For Prosecution' By
State's Attorney, 15 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1208 (May 1, 1986); Radin, Corporate Criminal
Liability for Employee-Endangering Activities, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 49 (1983-85); Com-
ment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control Corporate Be-
havior? 38 Sw. L.J. 1275 (1985).
6. Spurgeon & Fagan, Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct, 72 CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400 (1981). "[S]imultaneous beneficial and detrimental aspects of corporate
conduct present lawmakers with the challenge of curtailing socially harmful activity without sti-
fling the industrial process." Id.
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grow in number and expand the realm of their activities,7 and as traditional
methods of controlling corporate behavior fail,8 state district attorneys are
imposing criminal charges against corporations and/or the individuals
within the corporation for work-site deaths. 9
Following a background section which traces corporate criminal liabil-
ity in general, this Comment addresses the difficulties local prosecutors
have encountered in applying homicide statutes against corporations, with a
section devoted to Wisconsin developments and the viability of a corporate
homicide charge in the Wisconsin courts. The final section of this Com-
ment examines the defenses relied upon in recent cases, including a preemp-
tion argument which must be considered by the United States Supreme
Court in the near future.
II. BACKGROUND
According to early common law, corporations could not be held crimi-
nally liable."° Corporations were viewed as mere legal entities, created for
limited purposes" and therefore not culpable of moral blame.' 2 However,
with the increased interaction of corporations in society, corporate activity
7. Prior to 1800, there were only 225 private corporations and about 2,000 public corpora-
tions. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 393, 404 (1982). As of 1983, there were 2,999,000 corporations in the United States. U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 503 (10th ed. 1987).
8. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) was passed by Congress in 1970 to
assure all workers a safe and healthy working environment. Occupational Safety and Health Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 2(a) et seq., 85 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. § 654 et seq. (1982). As this Act was
originally written, OSHA inspections were to be unannounced. Id. at § 8(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1596 at
8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. at § 657(a)(1). However, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the
United States Supreme Court decided that unannounced inspections, without a search warrant,
were unconstitutional. OSHA also contained provisions allowing a $1,000 fine for a serious viola-
tion and a $10,000 fine for each willful or repeated violation. Id. at § 17, 84 Stat. 1596 at § 17, 29
U.S.C. at § 666. In 1979, the average fine for a willfull or repeated violation was $367. MINTZ,
OSHA: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 338-39 (1984). Because of these developments, OSHA has
not impacted worker safety to the degree intended by Congress.
9. See generally Comment, Corporations Can Kill Too: After Film Recovery; Are Individuals
Accountable for Corporate Crimes? 19 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 1411 (1986); Developments in the Law,
Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1227 (1979).
10. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909).
11. The argument was that a corporation could only carry on the activities stated in its arti-
cles of incorporation. All other activities were ultra vires, and therefore the corporation could not
commit the offense. This argument was readily rejected by the courts. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corpora-
tions § 2134 (1985). See, e.g., Music Box, Inc. v. Mills, 10 La. App. 665, 121 So. 196 (1929).
12. The philosophy of early criminal law was to punish the person through imprisonment,
and since a corporation could not be imprisoned, there was no reason to find it guilty of a crime.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW 257 (2d ed. 1986).
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which violated the rights of individuals became more prevalent. 13 The
United States had created a creature which it could not control. In re-
sponse, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act of 188714 and the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890,15 which imposed numerous regulations
on corporations. Regulatory agencies, however, have proven to be less than
effective in regulating corporate behavior. Currently local prosecutors, in an
attempt to regulate corporate behavior, are applying traditional criminal
law against corporations. 6
A. The Emergence of Criminal Sanctions Against Corporations
When regulatory agencies were established, they were given the power
to impose criminal fines against corporations for rule violations. 17 During
this same period, federal statutes were promulgated which gave the United
States Attorney's Office the power to hold corporations liable under crimi-
nal statutes.18
In 1904, in United States v. Van Schaick,19 conventional criminal law
principles were applied against a corporation for the first time.20 The cor-
porate owner of a steamship was held criminally liable when the steamship
caught fire, forcing the passengers to jump into the river. The life preserv-
ers which the steamship provided were ill-maintained and unusable, and
over 900 persons drowned. The managing directors, officers, and master of
the ship were also indicted. The relevant federal statute in Van Shaick al-
lowed prosecution for manslaughter if the life of any person was destroyed
by "misconduct, negligence, or inattention to ... duties on [the] vessel"'"
by any person employed on the steamship.22 The statute did not even men-
tion the word "intent" and therefore the prosecutor was relieved of the bur-
den of proving intent. Based on the non-intent statute, the court found the
corporation and its agents guilty of manslaughter for their criminally negli-
gent conduct.23
13. Brickey, supra note 7, at 404-05.
14. 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
16. See supra notes 8-9.
17. For instance, the penalties available for imposition by the Federal Trade Commission
range from three years imprisonment to a million dollar fine. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1982).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 19-29.
19. 134 F. 592 (1904).
20. Id.
21. 70 U.S. Comp. Stat. § 5344 (1901).
22. Id.
23. Van Schaick, 134 F. at 609.
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Four years later, in New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co. v.
United States,24 the United States Supreme Court held that a corporation
could be charged with a crime which required specific intent.25 In New
York Central, the Supreme Court held that a railroad company could be
held criminally liable for offering rebates to sugar refining companies that
shipped their products with the railroad company. This conduct was in
violation of the Elkins Act,26 which further provided that
the act, omission, or failure of any officer, agent, or other person
acting for or employed by any common carrier acting within the
scope of his employment shall in every case be also deemed to be the
act, omission or failure of [the corporation] as well as of that
person.27
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this statute which im-
puted an agent's knowledge and actions to a corporation. The Court, bas-
ing its decision on public policy, believed that if it held to the contrary,
Congress would be stripped of its ability to regulate the actions of corpo-
rations.28 Interestingly, the Court noted "that there are some crimes, which
in their nature cannot be committed by corporations."29
B. State Law
During this same period, the state criminal justice systems also began
charging corporations with crimes.3" However, the states faced great diffi-
culty in applying state criminal codes to corporations because most state
criminal codes' definition of "person" typically did not include corpora-
tions.31 When the state systems began criminally charging corporations
with homicide, it was usually under statutes requiring some form of specific
intent with no provisions for imputation of the mens rea of the corporate
officers to the corporation.32
24. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
25. Id. at 493. New York Central was affirmed in United States v. Union Supply Co., 215
U.S. 50 (1909), where the Court stated "[corporations] are as much within the mischief aimed at
as private persons, and as capable of a 'wilful' breach of the law." Id. at 55.
26. 32 U.S. Comp. Stat. § 847 (1909).
27. Id. at 847(1).
28. New York Central, 212 U.S. at 494-96.
29. Id. at 494. For instance, a crime that a corporation could not commit is rape.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 33-46.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 35-66.
32. Some states still provide no guidance for imputation. Compare Wisconsin Statutes Chap-
ter 939 which provides no statutory guide for imputation of agents' actions or mens rea to the
corporation with the Kentucky Penal Code which states:
(1) A corporation is guilty of an offense when:
[Vol. 71:793
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
It .was not until 1919 that state courts began to accept the notion of
corporate homicide. In Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney Street Passenger
Railway Co.," a street car passenger was allegedly killed by the corpora-
tion's criminal negligence. A Pennsylvania County Court of Appeals wres-
tled with the issue of whether the corporation could be indicted for
negligent homicide. The court recognized that a corporation could be held
civilly liable for torts such as assault and battery, which require an element
of personal violence. However, with no criminal law precedent upon which
to rely, the court held that "a corporation cannot be indicted for offenses
involving the element of personal violence as assault and battery, nor for
offenses involving the element of malice or criminal intent."34
In 1909, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Rochester Railway
& Light Co., was asked to hold a corporation liable for second degree
manslaughter for negligently installing a leaky gas valve which caused the
death of a resident of the home.36 The statute defined homicide as "the
killing of one human being by the act, procurement or omission of 'an-
other.' ",3 While finding no legislative intent which would support holding
the corporation liable, the court in Rochester Railway stated:
We think that this final word "another" naturally and clearly means
a second or additional member of the same kind or class alone re-
ferred to by the preceding words, namely, another human being, and
that we should not interpret it as appellant asks us to, as meaning
another "person," which might then include corporations. It seems
to us that it would be a violent strain upon a criminal statute to
construe this word as meaning an agency of some kind other than
that already mentioned or referred to, and as bridging over a radical
transition from human beings to corporations. Therefore, we con-
strue this definition of homicide as meaning the killing of one human
being by another human being.38
(a) The conduct constituting the offense consists of a failure to discharge a specific duty
imposed upon corporations by law; or
(b) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, commanded or wan-
tonly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within
the scope of his employment in behalf of the corporation; or
(c) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation act-
ing within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation ....
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 502.050 (Baldwin 1984).
33. 24 Pa. C. 25, reprinted in 48 PiTrs. LEG. J. 42 (1900).
34. Punxsutawney, 24 Pa. C. at 26.
35. 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 107-08, 88 N.E. at 24.
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This strict reading of the statute39 prevented the corporation from being
subjected to criminal liability.'
Four years later in Commonwealth v. Illinois Central Railway Co.,4' the
Kentucky Court of Appeals was faced with a case almost identical to Punx-
sutawney. At that time, the Kentucky courts had no statutory definition of
manslaughter to rely upon, and therefore relied on the common law defini-
tion.42 Quoting extensively from Rochester Railway and Punxsutawney, the
court dismissed the action, but added in dicta "that an indictment might be
made to lie, if authorized by a statute including corporations.
43
As time has shown, the most influential of the early corporate homicide
cases was State v. Lehigh Valley Railway Co.' In Lehigh, a railway com-
pany was charged with manslaughter after one of its railway cars loaded
with explosives blew up and killed a person.45 Noting that the statutory
definition of "person" for purposes of applying the manslaughter statute
included corporate bodies, the court indicted the railway company 46 and
stated:
[Rochester Railway] is a good illustration of the way in which the
proper growth and development of the law can be prevented by the
hard and fast language of a statute, and of the advantage of our own
system by which the way is open for a court to do justice by the
proper application of legal principles.47
The foregoing state cases all dealt with a corporation's criminal liability
for violating a statute with a mens rea element of criminal negligence. As
will be seen in the next section of this Comment, prosecutors are now hold-
39. One author divides corporate homicide cases into two categories: (1) "strict common
law" cases, which do not find corporations within the definition of "person"; and (2) "statutory
common law" or "interpretative common law" cases which do include corporations within the
definition of "person", and therefore allow a corporate homicide indictment. Comment, Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Controversy Flames Anew, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 465,
476-82 (1980-81).
40. Rochester Railway, 195 N.Y. at 108, 88 N.E. at 24.
41. 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913).
42. Id. at -, 153 S.W. at 461. Manslaughter was defined by common law as "the killing of
one person by another person .. " The court noted that there was statutory authority for
including corporations within the definition of "person" but that "the word 'another' can only
mean another member of the same class as the slayer, and a corporation, though a 'person' in law,
is but an artificial person, and therefore not of the class to which the person slain belongs." Id. at
._ 153 S.W. at 461-62.
43. Id. at __, 153 S.W. at 463.
44. 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917), afid on second appeal, 92 N.J.L. 261, 106 A. 23 (1919).
45. The facts of Lehigh Valley are found only in the report of the second appeal. 92 N.J.L. at
, 106 A. at 23.
46. 90 N.J.L. at 103 A. at 687, af'd on second appeal, 92 N.J.L. at -, 106 A. at 23.
47. 90 N.J.L. at , 103 A. at 686.
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ing corporations indictable for statutes with a mens rea element of
recklessness.
III. HOLDING CORPORATIONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Before a corporation can be charged with a homicide, there are three
obstacles the prosecutor must overcome: 1) the corporation must fall
within the definition of "person" as used in the homicide statute; 2) the
corporation must possess the required mens rea through imputation; and 3)
the corporation must have "caused" the death.
A. Including Corporations Within the Statutory Definition of "Person"
An analysis of the state criminal code is the first step for a prosecutor in
determining whether a corporation can be indicted for a criminal homicide
prosecution. More specifically, it must be determined whether a corpora-
tion is included within the definition of the term "person" as used in the
homicide statute."a Recent cases have shown, however, that the statutory
language is not determinative of whether a corporation will be indicted for
homicide.4 9 Some courts have refused to hold corporations within the stat-
utory definition of "person" even when it appears obvious that the drafting
legislature intended to include corporations.50 Conversely, other courts
have held corporations criminally indictable for homicide when it is not
even implied by the language of the statute that corporations should be
included within the definition of "person.""
Recently, many state legislatures have specifically included "corpora-
tions" within the definition of "person" in their homicide statutes.2 A
good example is the Texas Penal Code. Texas Penal Code section 19.07(a)
states: "A person commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual
48. Most often the term "person" is used in homicide statutes. However, the statute may
state that "whoever commits the following act is guilty of manslaughter" or "one who commits
the following act is guilty of manslaughter." Regardless of the term used, the corporation must be
included within the definition of the term if the statute is to be applied to a corporation.
49. The following cases have upheld homicide indictments against corporations even though
no statute specifically addresses corporate homicide. Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court of
Fresno, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983); People v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 77 Misc.
2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974); Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 283 Pa.
Super. 1, 423 A.2d 413 (1980). Absent corporate homicide statutes, the following cases have
rejected corporate homicide indictments: State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530
(1961); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 737 S.W.2d
805 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
50. See, e.g., Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) rev'd, 737
S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
51. See, e.g., State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961).
52. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.07(a), 1.07(17) and 1.07(27) (Vernon 1974).
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by criminal negligence.",5 3 The statute goes on to define an "individual" as
a "human being who has been born and is alive"54 and further defines the
"person" able to commit a homicide as "an individual, corporation or asso-
ciation."55 The consensus should be that when a legislature explicitly in-
cludes "corporation" within the definition of "person" in the homicide
statute, with no limitations,56 it is clear that the legislature intended to al-
low corporations to be charged with homicides. 7
Other state legislatures have added what has been termed a "safe-harbor
provision" to the definition of "person."58 For instance, in Commonwealth
of Kentucky v. Fortner LP Gas Co. 59 the Court of Appeals had to extrapo-
late the legislature's intent from a criminal statute which read: a 'person'
[able to commit a homicide] means human being, and where appropriate, a
public or private corporation .... -6  The court, relying on other factors, 61
decided that the Kentucky legislature intended to include corporations
within the statutory definition of "person" when applying the homicide
statute. Accordingly, Fortner LP Gas illustrates how "safe-harbor provi-
sions" can provide a court with greater interpretive powers and opportunity
for judicial legislation.
However, when State v. Pacific Powder Co.62 was decided by the
Supreme Court of Oregon, the Oregon statute contained language almost
identical to that relied upon by the court in Fortner LP Gas.63 Although the
Oregon statute included corporations within the definition of "person," the
Oregon legislature qualified this definition with the phrase "unless the con-
text requires otherwise." ' The court examined the penalty for involuntary
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1.07(17).
55. Id. § 1.07(27).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 59-65.
57. But see Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 737
S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (The Texas Court of Appeals refused to hold a corporation liable
for criminally negligent homicide even though the homicide statute included corporations within
the definition of "person.").
58. Barbone, The Corporation's Liability In Criminal Law, 20 THE PROSECUTOR 13, 28
(1986).
59. 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
60. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.080(12) (Baldwin 1984) (emphasis added).
61. The court made reference to other Kentucky statutes which specifically enunciated what
type of corporate conduct constituted an offense and noted that the statute prescribed the amount
of fines applicable to corporations. Fortner LP Gas, 610 S.W.2d at 942-43.
62. 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961).
63. Id. at ._ 360 P.2d at 532. The Oregon statute has been revised, but still contains a safe-
harbor provision. It now states: .'Person' means a human being and, where appropriate a public
or private corporation ...." OR. REV. STAT. § 161.015(5) (1983).
64. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.015 (1983); see also Pacific Powder, 226 Or. at -, 360 P.2d at 531.
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manslaughter, which was a mandatory prison term, and decided that a cor-
poration was not within the definition of "person" as used in the man-
slaughter statute.6 1 Still other states, by not defining the term "person" in
their homicide statutes, leave the area completely open for judicial
interpretation.66
B. Imputing the Agent's Mens Rea to the Corporation
If it is determined that the corporation falls within the definition of a
"person" able to commit a homicide, the second obstacle for the prosecutor
is imputing the requisite mens rea of the offense to the corporation. Some
crimes have no mens rea element and therefore a mere commission of the
act is a crime, regardless of the mental state of the actor. These are strict
liability offenses.67 If the offense is a strict liability offense, only the actions
of the agent must be imputed to the corporation, because the mens rea need
not be proven. Generally, the actions of an agent are imputed to the corpo-
ration if the agent was acting within the scope of his authority.68 If the
agent's actions are imputed to the corporation, the corporation is then vi-
cariou.ly liable for the agent's criminal actions. As a result, the corporation
is held liable for the actions of another.69 However, if the offense is not a
strict liability offense, the mental element required by the homicide statute70
must be met. Theoretically, corporations can violate statutes with any
mens rea level.7'
In People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc. ,72 a recent and well-publicized
case, a corporation was charged with and convicted of violating a statute
with mens rea elements of both recklessness and intent.73 This is very unu-
sual because typically a corporation is charged with violating a statute with
only a recklessness or criminally negligent mens rea element. The differ-
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 939.22 (1985-86).
67. For a detailed explanation of vicarious and strict liability see State v. Beaudry, 123 Wis.
2d 40, 365 N.W.2d 593 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 12, at 242-67.
68. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 12, at 260.
69. Id.
70. The Model Penal Code lists four levels of mens rea: (1) purposely; (2) knowingly; (3)
recklessly; and (4) negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft 1985).
71. Id.
72. People v. Film Recovery Sys., Inc., No. 83-11091 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14,
1985) consolidated with People v. O'Neil, No. 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14,
1985).
73. In Film Recovery, the Cook County State Attorney's office convicted the corporation and
five members of the company of involuntary manslaughter. The charge came after an employee of
Film Recovery died of cyanide poisoning. A cyanide solution was used to recover silver from
used film. Although Film Recovery had a gross income between thirteen and twenty million
1988]
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ence between these two mental states is that a reckless act requires the actor
to have a conscious disregard of the risk,7 4 whereas a criminally negligent
act is considered objectively, that is, without concern for whether the actor
consciously knew of the risk.7 Whether the particular conduct violated
these standards is a question of fact. Therefore, the definition given to these
terms in the jury instructions becomes very important.
Each state defines these terms, but the Model Penal Code states that
"[a] person acts recklessly... when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the [death] will result from his conduct. ' 76 The
Model Penal Code states that "[a] person acts negligently . . . when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the [death] will
result from his conduct ... [ard tile conduct is] a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation. 7
7
Traditionally, statutes with recklessness or criminal negligence as a
mens rea element were used only to prosecute conduct such as waving a gun
in a person's face and having it discharge, or causing a death by driving a
car at excessive speeds.78 In these cases there was no intentional or pur-
poseful homicide, yet a death resulted from egregious conduct. Despite
case law defining these mental elements, recent successful corporate homi-
cide prosecutions appear to erode the level of culpability required under
these statutes, 79 especially when the "person" committing the offense is a
corporation which will not be subject to a term of imprisonment and will
merely have to pay a fine from the company coffers. Professor LaFave ex-
plains criminal negligence this way:
Thus it has been suggested that if there were 1000 pistols on a table,
all unloaded but one, and if A, knowing this, should pick one at
dollars per year, it failed to implement even the simplest safety devices such as fans, protective
clothing or face masks. Comment, supra note 9, at 1425-28.
There are indications that the company even removed the warning labels from the cyanide
containers so as to not allow the employees to read them. Barbone, supra note 58, at 13. The
Illinois prosecutor also had to prove the intentional element of the involuntary manslaughter stat-
ute. Illinois dcfined involuntary manslaughter as follows: "A person who unintentionally kills
an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether
lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily
harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly .... " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-3
(Smith-Hurd 1979).
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft 1985).
75. Id. at § 2.02(2)(d).
76. Id. at § 2.02(2)(c).
77. Id. at § 2.02(2)(d).
78. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 12, at 233, 239.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 92-101.
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random and fire it at B, killing him, A's conduct in creating the risk
of death, though the risk is very slight (one-tenth of 1%) would be
[criminally negligent], in view of its complete lack of social utility. 80
It is not difficult to imagine occupations which flirt with the odds of death
similar to those of the pistol example, such as policemen or firemen or win-
dow washers. However, because the persons in those occupations arguably
have a greater utility to society than a company which reclaims silver and
grosses between thirteen and twenty million dollars,8" their chance of being
criminally charged with a homicide is less.
Next, the mental element of the homicide statute must be transferred
(imputed) from the agent(s) to the corporation. Because a corporation, by
itself, has no mental capacity, the mind and mental state of the corporation
is the mind and mental state of the people employed by the corporation.82
The charge may be lodged against the corporation to hold "someone" liable
when individual accountability cannot be established because many em-
ployees were involved and collectively had the required mens rea.83 Suc-
cessful corporate prosecutions are less difficult because "[t]he collective
knowledge of corporate agents may suffice to establish a knowing violation
of a criminal statute notwithstanding the absence of proof that any single
agent intended to commit the offense or even knew of the operative facts
that led to the violation." 84 For instance, a corporation can be successfully
prosecuted when one agent knows of a dangerous element in the corpora-
tion and believes there are adequate safety precautions, and another agent
knows the precautionary measures are not present.
However, to indict the corporation, there must exist a "sufficiently close
relationship" between the corporation and the agent(s) possessing the re-
quired mens rea and the agent(s) committing the wrongful act.85 Exactly
what constitutes a "sufficiently close relationship" has not been fully liti-
gated by the state courts in the corporate homicide context, but guidance
can be obtained from federal regulatory criminal cases. 86
80. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 12, at 233.
81. See supra note 73.
82. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 12, at 257; see also New York Central, 212 U.S. 481
(1909).
83. See United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974).
84. 1 K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 83 (1984).
85. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(b) (Official Draft 1985) which defines an "agent" as
"any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corpora-
tion"; see also 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 2136 (1985). But see State v. Chapman Dodge
Center, Inc., 428 So. 2d 413 (La. 1983). See also infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
86. In United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975), the states of mind of
the company president, superintendent, foreperson and machine operator were imputed to the
corporation in order to find it guilty of a willful OSHA violation. In United States v. Hilton
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In most jurisdictions, corporations can be held liable for acts (or omis-
sions) of an employee, whether the employee is an officer, director, man-
ager, supervisor or agent, if the employee is acting within the scope of
authority. Some jurisdictions, however, have limited corporate criminal lia-
bility to acts committed by "high managerial officers." 7
The holding in State v. Chapman Dodge Center, Inc.," that low-ranking
employees' intent was not imputed to the corporation for a lesser included
offense of theft, cannot be reconciled with federal courts which have found
corporations liable for conduct of even the lowest ranking employee.89 Fu-
ture cases coming before courts will be forced to resolve this issue. Because
corporations are controlled by "high managerial officers" and therefore
tend to reflect the collective identities of those officers, it is logical to hold
the corporation criminally liable only for the mens rea and acts of "high
managerial officers." An alternative method would hold the corporation
vicariously liable for all agents conducting "high managerial activities,"
leaving the question of what constitutes "high managerial activities" to the
trier of fact.
In the federal courts it is not a defense to claim that the employee acted
against the express direction of a superior, if the employee acted within the
scope of authority.9" However, the federal courts require that the corpora-
tion obtain a benefit from the employee's action before holding the corpora-
tion liable for the employee's criminal act.91
Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), the corporation
was held criminally liable for an agent's conduct "even though contrary to general corporate
policy and express instructions to the agent." Id. at 1007.
87. See, e.g., Statev. Adjustment Dept. Credit Bureau, Inc., 94 Idaho 156, 483 P.2d 687
(1971); Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 343 Pa. Super. 387, 494 A.2d 1139 (1985).
88. 428 So. 2d 413 (La. 1983).
89. See, e.g., Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78; Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000.
90. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000.
91. See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); United
States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Egan v. United
States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943); United States v. LaBar, 521
F. Supp. 203 (M.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd, 688 F.2d 826 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 945
(1982); cf Magnolia Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950 (9th Cir.1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959). But see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.




C. Who/What 'Caused' the Death?
If the corporation falls within the statutory definition of "person" 92 and
the agent's mental state and actions are imputed to it,93 the third obstacle
for the prosecutor is to show that the wrongful act "caused" the death.
Clearly, when a human being points a gun at another human being and
pulls the trigger, and death results, the actor has "caused" a death. In con-
trast, it is much more difficult to determine whether a corporation has
"caused" the death of a human being when it acts recklessly or negligently.
A recent case offers a good example. In Connecticut v. PGP Industries,
Inc.," a security guard on duty at PGP died from carbon monoxide poison-
ing after a hurricane knocked out the power in the industrial plant for three
hours. Without power, the exhaust fans over the smelting furnaces did not
force carbon monoxide generated from the furnaces out of the building.
The work area filled with poisonous gas and killed the security guard. PGP
was charged with criminally negligent homicide for "causing" the death of
the security guard. To obtain the indictment, the prosecutor argued that
PGP's failure to have an emergency backup power source for the operation
of the fans was criminally negligent behavior. Defense counsel contended
that the hurricane caused the death, not the corporation.9" A jury was to
decide the case, but at the close of the state's case defense counsel made a
motion for dismissal which was granted by the circuit court judge.
In People v. Warner-Lambert Co.,96 a state court specifically addressed
the issue of "cause" in the corporate homicide context. In Warner-Lam-
bert, six employees were killed when magnesium stearate (MS) a dust used
in making chewing gum, was ignited by an unknown source and a massive
fire and explosion ensued.97 The corporation and the individual defendants
admitted that they were aware of the risk of explosion when using MS.98
The prosecution charged the corporation with both reckless and criminally
negligent homicide,99 but the trial court found that the evidence was legally
insufficient to sustain the indictments. The appellate division reversed. 1°°
The Court of Appeals of New York, in quashing the indictment, stated:
92. See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
94. Connecticut v. PGP Indus., No. CR-123536 (Waterbury Cir. Ct. of Conn. 1986).
95. New Haven Advocate, Jan. 8, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
96. 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 298, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
99. Id. at 302, 414 N.E.2d at 663, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
100. Id. at 295, 414 N.E.2d at 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
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The focus of our attention must be on the issue of culpability, taking
into account the conduct of defendants and the factors both of for-
seeability and of causation, all of which in combination constitute
the ultimate amalgam on which criminal liability may or may not be
predicated.
We subscribe to the requirement that the defendants' actions must
be a sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death before there can be
any imposition of criminal liability, and recognize, of course, that
this standard is greater than that required to serve as a basis for tort
liability .... (citation omitted).
[T]he evidence.., was not legally sufficient to establish the foresee-
ability of the actual immediate, triggering cause of the
explosion .... 101
Because the spark came from an unknown source and was not foreseeable,
the Warner-Lambert court determined that the corporation should not be
held criminally liable for these deaths. The Warner-Lambert court has
given direction to the area of "cause" within homicide statutes. Warner-
Lambert stands for the proposition that the life-threatening situation by
which a human being is killed must have been reasonably foreseeable by the
corporation. After this is affirmatively decided, the corporation's conduct is
compared to the standard of care required by the statute. Therefore, prose-
cutors must analyze each factual pattern carefully to determine if the above-
mentioned obstacles can be overcome.
IV. VIABILITY OF A CORPORATE HOMICIDE CHARGE IN WISCONSIN
A current question is whether a corporate homicide charge will with-
stand judicial scrutiny in Wisconsin. Viewing the statutes and common law
from non-homicidal cases, the law appears ready to accept a corporate
homicide conviction. However, Wisconsin prosecutors will have to closely
scrutinize the factual pattern of each case because Wisconsin courts have
exhibited some of the same reservations mentioned above. 102
Chapter 939 of the Wisconsin Statutes addresses general provisions con-
cerning crimes in Wisconsin.103 Section 939.22 specifically defines words
and phrases used throughout the criminal code."°  Although the word
101. Id. at 304-07, 414 N.E.2d at 664-66, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 164-65.
102. Compare State v. Beaudry, 123 Wis. 2d 40, 365 N.W.2d 593 (1985) with People v.
Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981).
103. Wis. STAT. §§ 939.01-.74 (1985-86).
104. Id. at § 939.22.
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"whoever" is used in the homicide statutes, 105 the code does not further
define this term. Both the reckless and negligent homicide statutes state:
"[w]hoever causes the death of another human being"' 06 is guilty of a homi-
cide. Use of "another" implies that the term "whoever" must also be a
human being.1 7 Although there was a section enacted with the original
homicide statute which reflected a legislative intent to include a corporation
as one able to commit a homicide, this subsection was later repealed.'08
When the Wisconsin Criminal Code was promulgated there was an addi-
tional section included, 0 9 which "was eliminated, upon motion of an advi-
sory committee member who was a house counsel for a large industrial
corporation."' "1 Section 339.07"l stated that "[a] corporation is criminally
responsible for acts committed by its agents when acting within the scope of
their authority." " 2
Under a fundamental principle of statutory construction, courts should
interpret terms by their common usage if not explicitly defined in a stat-
ute."l 3 In the past, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has exhibited a willing-
ness to violate this principle.' Although the statute which was violated
did not use the term "whoever," the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Vulcan
Last Co. v. State,I 5 held a corporation liable for a criminal offense under a
statute which stated that no "person" shall attempt to influence a voter by
threatening the person with discharge from employment."16 To support the
extension of the statute to corporations the court used the fact that the term
"person" includes corporate entities in a wholly separate statute.' 17 As ad-
ditional support for its holding, the court quoted a treatise stating that
"[t]he same law that creates a corporation may create the crime, and to
105. Wis. STAT. §§ 940.01-.09 (1985-86).
106. Id. at § 940.06, .08.
107. Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913); People v.
Ebasco Service, 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974); People v. Rochester R.R. Light Co.,
195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909); State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961).
108. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
109. Wis. STAT. § 339.07 (Proposed Draft 1953).
110. Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 350, 362 (1956).
111. Wis. STAT. § 339.07 (Proposed Draft 1953). The Wisconsin Criminal Code was renum-
bered to the 900 series. If this section had been retained, it would now be § 939.097.
112. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF WISCONSIN, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
1953, Bill No. 100, A, at 6-7 (1953).
113. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, at 76; Murphy, Old Maxims
Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 114-21.
115. 194 Wis. 636, 217 N.W. 412 (1928).
116. Id.
117. WiS. STAT. § 370.01(12) (1927).
1988]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
assert that the legislature cannot punish its own creature because it cannot
make a creature capable of violating the law does not . . . . bear discus-
sion.""' s The court, however, failed to adequately address the issue. The
issue was not whether the legislature could create a law which imposed
sanctions against a corporation, but rather, did the legislature create a law
which imposed criminal sanctions against a corporation. Vulcan Last has
repeatedly been referred to for the general proposition that Wisconsin al-
lows corporate criminal liability. 119
Also in support of the position that corporations generally are subject to
criminal statutes, a Wisconsin prosecutor may cite State v. Dried Milk Prod-
ucts Cooperative,120 where the corporate owner of a truck was found guilty
of a criminal offense. The statute stated that no "person" shall operate a
truck on Class "A" highways when over a certain weight limit. Even
though only one employee was driving the truck, the corporation was held
liable for this offense. 12' In that case, however, two other sections of the
same statute made it clear that the legislature wanted the "owner of the
vehicle" who permitted the violation to be held liable for the fine. 122 In
addition, Dried Milk Products is also distinguishable from homicide cases
because the statute violated in that case was a general welfare statute, and
such statutes have traditionally been applied to corporations.
If it is found that a corporation falls within the definition of "whoever"
as used in the homicide statutes, corporations could violate statutes of three
mens rea categories. 123 If the harmful conduct of the corporation was as
egregious as the harm in People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., it would
118. Vulcan Last, 194 Wis. at 643, 217 N.W. at 415.
119. Vulcan Last is cited as supporting corporate criminal prosecutions in the following cases
and annotations: State v. Dried Milk Prod. Co-op., 16 Wis. 2d 357, 114 N.W.2d 412 (1962); 36
Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 30, 32 (1947); Annotation, Corporation's Liability to Criminal Prosecution as
Affected by Punishment or Penalty Imposed, 80 A.L.R. 3d 1220 (1977).
120. 16 Wis. 2d 357, 114 N.W.2d 412 (1962).
121. Id. at 363, 114 N.W.2d at 415.
122. WIS. STAT. § 348.02(3) (1961) provided: "Any owner of a vehicle who causes or per-
mits such vehicle to be operated on a highway in violation of this chapter is guilty of the violation
the same as if he had actually operated the vehicle himself." Id. Wis. STAT. § 348.20(1) (1961)
provided:
It is declared to be the public policy of the state that prosecutions for overweight violations
shall in every instance where practicable be instituted against the person holding the au-
thority, certificates, licenses or permits evidencing operating privileges from the public ser-
vice commission or motor vehicle department which may be the proper object of
cancellation or revocation proceedings.
Id.
123. See generally Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PIrr. L. REv. 21 (1957).
124. No. 83-11091 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill. June 14, 1985) consolidated with People v.
O'Neil, No. 84-5064 (Cook county Cir. Ct. of 11. June 14, 1985); see also supra note 73.
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be possible for a corporation to be indicted for violating section
940.02(l),125 which requires proof of "conduct imminently dangerous to
another and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life." '126 It
would be more probable for a corporation to be charged with violating the
homicide by reckless conduct statute. 127 The corporation would have to be
held vicariously liable for the conduct and the mens rea of the agent(s). 128
Although no decisions have been rendered which conclusively address the
issue of imputation of conduct and mens rea in a corporate homicide con-
text, it is probable that the courts would rely upon State v. Beaudry.129 In
Beaudry, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that Janet Beaudry, the
licensee of a corporation, was criminally responsible for the acts of her em-
ployee. The criminal statute violated was a strict liability statute.1 30 The
statute did not contain language to the effect that the act of a corporate
employee would be imputed to the licensee corporate owner. 13 1 Notwith-
standing, the court held that corporate employee conduct would be imputed
to Beaudry.1
32
Despite-the Wisconsin courts showing a tendency toward holding cor-
porations liable under the homicide statutes, the same courts have recently
shown some reservations, especially in the area of proving "cause." For
example, in State v. Serebin, 133 in a manner similar to the Warner-Lambert
court, 1 34 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed a jury verdict which
found the defendant, an administrator of a nursing home, guilty of homi-
cide by reckless conduct. 135 Serebin was charged after a resident from his
125. Wis. STAT. § 940.02(1) (1985-86). Section 940.02(1) states: "Whoever causes the death
of another human being... [b]y conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing a de-
praved mind" commits a second degree murder. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at §§ 940.06(1), (2). This section states:
Whoever causes the death of another human being by ... conduct consist[ing] of an act
which creates a situation of unreasonable risk and high probability of death or great bodily
harm to another and which demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of another
and a willingness to take known chances of perpetrating an injury is guilty of homicide by
reckless conduct.
Id.
128. See supra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
129. 123 Wis. 2d 40, 365 N.W.2d 593 (1985).
130. See supra text accompanying note 67.
131. Beaudry, 123 Wis. 2d at 51, 365 N.W.2d at 598.
132. Id. at 58, 365 N.W.2d at 601-02.
133. 119 Wis. 2d 837, 350 N.W.2d 65 (1984).
134. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); see also supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
135. Serabin, 119 Wis. 2d at 851, 350 N.W.2d at 72.
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insufficiently staffed nursing home wandered away from the home and froze
to death.
136
First, the Serebin court determined that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the jury verdict that the defendant Serebin acted recklessly in light
of the fact that state inspectors and staff nurses had repeatedly warned him
that the staff deficiencies put the safety and health of the residents in jeop-
ardy.137 Next, the court stated that "[iun order to prove that the defend-
ant's reckless conduct caused the death of [the victim], the state is required
to prove... that Serebin's recklessness in staffing [the nursing home] at an
insufficient level was 'a substantial factor in producing the death.' ,138 The
court pointed out that even with sufficient staffing, the victim may have
wandered away from the nursing home and died because of the cold
weather. 139 In Serebin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court showed a reluctance
to hold one liable for homicide when that person has not directly caused the
death at issue."
V. POST-CHARGING OPTIONS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In this new and uncharted area, corporations should become aware of
post-charging options. While not exhaustive, this section of the Comment
offers advice for corporate action after the homicide charge has been issued.
Currently, some local district attorneys are investigating work-site
deaths.4 These investigators will wish to speak with workers, managers
and probably even the corporate officers. Knowing that the decision to is-
sue a charge lies totally within the discretion of the district attorney, 142 the
corporation's cooperation with investigators will be appreciated and may
influence a decision not to prosecute a charge. However, the decision to
cooperate must be balanced with another consideration. As recent cases
have shown, individuals within the corporation may also be personally
charged with the offense. 143 Therefore, when the district attorney investiga-
136. Id. at 839, 350 N.W.2d at 66.
137. Id. at 844, 350 N.W.2d at 69.
138. Id. at 846-47, 350 N.W.2d at 70 (citing Cranmore v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 271 N.W.2d
402 (Ct. App. 1978); Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1977)).
139. Serabin, 119 Wis.2d at 851, 350 N.W.2d at 72.
140. But see State v. McClose, 95 Wis. 2d 49, 289 N.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1980) (expanding
the concept of direct cause).
141. Workplace Hazards, supra note 5, at 1132-33.
142. State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987);
Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 878-931 (6th ed. 1986).
143. See generally United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943); People v. Film Recovery Sys., Inc., No. 83-11091 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of
Il1. June 14, 1985).
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tors arrive at the scene of the death, the corporation's employees may
choose not to answer questions and claim the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 144 This strategy may appear to "secure for the
corporation the benefits of a privilege it does not have."' 14 But as People v.
Film Recovery Systems, Inc. 146 has shown, almost any employee can be in-
dicted. In that case, an employee who claimed that he did not even possess
the authority of a foreperson was indicted and convicted of the homicide.147
A corporation, however, possesses no fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. 148 Therefore, this privilege must be asserted through the
individuals.
In addition, the charged corporation probably will wish to have all civil
litigation' 49 postponed until the criminal case is finalized. Generally, courts
will allow such a postponement "when the interests of justice seem to re-
quire such action."' 50 Certain evidence may not be discoverable in the
criminal context, but may be required to be disclosed under the civil discov-
ery process. In this situation a stay order is appropriate.
Once charged with a corporate homicide, the corporation must seek out
any available defenses. One possible defense is the "powerless to prevent
defense." The defense would have to be adopted from a federal regulatory
criminal case.' 51 In United States v. Park,'52 the chief executive officer of a
corporation was personally charged with violating the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act.5 3 The United States Supreme Court indicated that
"[t]he theory upon which responsible corporate agents are held criminally
accountable for 'causing' violations of the Act permits a claim that the de-
fendant was 'powerless' to prevent or correct the violation."' 54 In this way,
the Supreme Court provided a defense for an agent who is not morally
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 8, (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
146. Film Recovery, No. 83-11091.
147. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1431. Film Recovery has not yet been decided by the
Illinois Appellate Court. Telephone interview with Cook County Clerk of Courts Office (March
7, 1987).
148. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
149. In Wisconsin, if the person killed is an employee of the corporation, Worker's Compen-
sation is the exclusive remedy and therefore other tort actions are not available to the decedent's
estate. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1985-86). If the decedent is not an employee, the heirs may bring
a civil suit. The party convicted will be subject to collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil trial.
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
150. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12 n.27. The government may also obtain a stay order. Campbell v.
Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
151. Park, 421 U.S. 658.
152. Id.
153. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1982).
154. Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
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blameworthy for the offense. If the corporation can show that, as a whole,
it was "powerless to prevent" the homicide, the state criminal courts may
also adopt this defense.
Another, and more substantial defense, is that the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970155 (OSHA) preempts state prosecutorial activity in
the area of worker safety. This argument has never been raised at the ap-
pellate level in any state.
156
OSHA was promulgated by Congress in an attempt to secure a safe and
healthy working environment for all workers. 157 Generally, when OSHA
was created, it preempted state involvement in the area of worker safety.
158
However, OSHA specifically states that if no federal standard is in effect
concerning an area of worker safety, the state agencies and courts have reg-
ular jurisdiction over the area. 159 OSHA also provides a method by which
the individual states can gain control of a safety or health issue to which
there is a federal standard in effect. 160 If a state "desires to assume respon-
sibility for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and
health standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue with
respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated ... [the state]
shall submit a State plan for the development of such standards and their
155. Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 2(a) et seq., 84 Stat. 1590, 29
U.S.C. 651 et seq. (1982).
156. A similar argument was raised at the trial court level when Ford Motor Company was
charged with reckless homicide in 1979. Ford was charged after three teenage girls burned to
death in a Ford Pinto. Ford allegedly knew the cars to be dangerous but marketed them anyway.
When the local prosecutor brought criminal charges, Ford moved to dismiss the case on preemp-
tion grounds. Ford maintained that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was the
sole regulation concerning vehicle safety and that it preempted state criminal prosecutions in the
same area. The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss and the case went to trial. The jury
acquitted Ford Motor Company and, therefore, the state prosecutor lacked standing to appeal this
issue to a higher court. Maakestad, State v. Ford Motor Co.: Constitutional, Utilitarian and Moral
Perspectives, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 857 (1983).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). A preliminary provision of OSHA states:
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exercise of its powers to
regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations and to provide for
the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources ....
Id.
158. OSHA, a federal law, preempts state law in accord with the supremacy clause of the
Constitution; see also Stanislawski v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 11. 2d 36, 457 N.E.2d 399 (1983).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1982).
160. Id. at § 667(b).
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enforcement." '161 The state plan must be at least as effective as the federal
plan. 162
Given these limitations of OSHA, it appears that state prosecutors
should only be allowed to charge corporations with homicides in a few situ-
ations. A corporate homicide charge would be allowed if the death is
caused by a lack of safety in an area in which no federal standard has been
promulgated. For example, if a death was the result of being exposed to an
element to which there is no federal standard, the local prosecution would
not be preempted.1 63  On the other hand, a state homicide prosecution
would not be allowed if the death was caused by an improperly shored
trench. The charge would not stand because a federal standard specifically
addresses the proper trench-shoring requirements. 1" Given the above pro-
visions, OSHA would generally preempt local prosecutions because of the
extensive standards promulgated under OSHA. 65 However, there is one
additional provision of OSHA which deserves mention and gives support
for the proposition that corporate homicide charges are not preempted by
OSHA.' 66 Section 653(b)(4) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supercede or in any
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or di-
minish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory
rights, duties or liabilities of employers and employees under any
law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising
out of, or in the course of, employment. 167
Thus, this statute raises an issue whether Congress intended to include lia-
bility for corporate homicide when it stated that "this chapter shall [not] be
construed to supercede the common law or statutory ... liabilities of em-
161. Id.
162. Id. at § 667(c)(6); see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. 3d 762, 654 P.2d 157, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1982).
163. See Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) where the court
allowed an employee's petition for an injunction to prevent the employer from exposing him to
tobacco smoke because OSHA provided no standards as to tobacco smoke, and therefore, did not
preempt the state common law duty to provide a safe place to work with respect to tobacco
smoke.
164. OSHA Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652 (1986).
165. See, e.g., Cook County v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 152 Ill. App. 3d 726, 504 N.E.2d
904 (1987) (where the Illinois Court of Appeals held that state criminal prosecution against a
corporation for aggravated battery and reckless conduct was preempted by OSHA).




ployers"' 6 s when there is a death of any employee. This question has been
unanswered by any appellate court.16 9
The tone of the statute appears to address only common law or statu-
tory duties and liabilities in the civil context. Furthermore, the abundant
inequities require that the states be required to enact a state plan before
allowing corporate homicide prosecutions. To this point, only large metro-
politan area district attorneys' offices have instituted a staff to investigate
corporate homicides. In effect, this means that it is more probable for a
corporation in a county which has a corporate homicide investigation staff
to be charged, whereas the same corporate conduct in an adjacent county
without such a staff will probably escape criminal liability. To assure uni-
form application of criminal statutes to corporations, states should only be
allowed to charge corporations if there is a state-wide agency responsible
for the investigation of the accident/crime scene. The concentration of cor-
porate homicide experts in one centralized state agency would not only pro-
vide greater efficiency and more expertise, but would also eliminate the
problem of duplication of services among the counties. This agency could
report its findings to the district attorney's office. The district attorney
could then make a decision whether to prosecute on the factual situation
contained in the agency's report.
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporate homicide charges are a novel but expanding trend. The ques-
tion requiring immediate judicial attention is whether OSHA preempts
these charges. When this question is answered, the arguments will be aimed
directly at the state statutes. With current state homicide statutes, as his-
tory already has shown, there will be varying state court decisions, which
should prompt legislative action to clear the areas of dispute.'7 ° Only when
these areas are affirmatively addressed by the courts and legislatures, will
corporate homicide be a fully recognized crime. It is then that corporate




169. See supra note 155.
170. For an analysis of proposed federal legislation, see Radin, supra note 5, at 68-74.
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